Stable alliance structures among monopoly component-suppliers in a decentralized assembly system are somewhat well understood. However, when there are competing suppliers for any particular component, less is known about such alliances. The intent of this paper is to address some of the theoretical issues that pose challenges in analyzing stable supplier coalitions in such assembly systems. We examine a simple assembly system in which n suppliers sell complementary components to a downstream assembler, who faces a price-sensitive deterministic demand.
Introduction
Assembly systems are an integral part of many supply chains. Loosely defined, an assembly system is a supply chain in which one agent (an assembler) buys complementary components from suppliers and assembles the product to meet demand. Such systems have been the topic of several papers in the operations literature. Examples include research that looks at incentive issues between the players leading to contract design and supply chain coordination (Wang and Gerchak, 2003; Gurnani and Gerchak, 2007; Gerchak and Wang, 2004) , characterizing and computing equilibrium values of decision levers such as wholesale price, capacity, and inventory at the various echelons (Bernstein and Decroix, 2006; Bernstein et al., 2007) , etc.
The topic of this paper is different. Consider a two-echelon assembly system, with n suppliers in the first echelon supplying components to a single downstream assembler who faces market demand.
The assembler buys the components from the suppliers, assembles the final product, and meets market demand. This is a model of assembly systems that has been used widely by researchers in operations management. We borrow this modeling framework in this paper. Papers in decentralized assembly systems usually assume that every supplier is a monopolist for the component that he supplies to the assembler. Thus, for any particular component, the assembler has no outside options except to buy from the said supplier (or forfeit assembling the product and being in business).
Clearly, this is an important assumption and is a driver of several of the results, especially when relative channel power is a variable of interest.
A paper that models multiple competing suppliers for a single component is the work by Jiang and Wang (2010) . To the best of our knowledge, this is the first (and thus far only) paper that explicitly models the existence of commodity components (i.e., one for which there are multiple suppliers). In this work, we consider an assembly system with n suppliers, k of them selling commodities to a downstream assembler who faces a price-sensitive deterministic demand; the remaining n − k suppliers are referred to as critical suppliers. For such a system, we predict the structure of the stable supplier coalitions. Our analysis can be described as follows. We first resolve the competition between suppliers selling substitutable components. One such resolution is found in Jiang and Wang (2010) , where this competition is purely settled through wholesale prices. Simply put, the supplier with the lowest production cost ends up supplying a particular component. Thus, at the end of this step, there are n component-suppliers, each selling a single component, where k of them who sell commodity components have passed through the previous competitive stage. In our paper, we accommodate a more general resolution. As such, our interest is not in characterizing which supplier is picked and how much the prices are, but rather on the eventual supplier coalition. We then propose, as commonly done in the literature, a two-stage game. In the first stage, suppliers form coalitions and determine the coalition structure (a partition of the set {1, 2, . . . , n}). Such coalitions can be thought of simply selling kits of components to the assembler. In the second stage, the different coalitions and the assembler compete with each other by setting wholesale and retail prices, respectively. In analyzing the second stage, we use two models of competition (with respect to timing of players' actions-please see Section 2 for more details). In every case, the equilibrium prices determine the individual profits of the n suppliers and the assembler. Thus, the profit of an individual player depends on the coalition structure in the market, the coalition that he is a member of (if the firm is a supplier), and the prices set by coalitions. Using this framework and working backwards, we predict the stable supplier coalition structures as a function of the competition and the number of critical and commodity suppliers.
We now provide a short review of the relevant literature on supplier coalition in assembly systems and then tie in the contribution of this paper to the literature. This literature uses a mixture of cooperative and non cooperative game theory to analyze the effect of the players' "power" on the structure of the assembly supply chain. Nagarajan and Bassok (2008) use a bargaining framework to predict the structure of supplier coalitions as a function of the negotiation power of the players.
Nagarajan and Sošić (hereafter denoted by N&S) (2009) perform a different analysis using a pricesensitive demand model with no explicit negotiation. Two papers that also study supplier coalitions are Granot and Yin (2008) , which looks at the coalition of all suppliers as a consequence of a push system, and Yin (2010) . These two papers use myopic notion of stability and are less interested in predicting the coalition structure as a function of channel power. A fundamental difference between this stream of literature and the current paper is existence of multiple competing suppliers for a particular component. This induces a heterogeneity among members of a potential coalition, and has important ramifications on how profits are split among agents and resulting effect on what evolves as the stable outcome. An important contribution of this paper is to resolve this issue in certain significant settings within the context of assembly systems.
In summary, our contribution in this paper is to address an important difficulty in well studied, existing models in operations management; we do this by extending the results in N&S (2009). Our results can also help the assembler to predict the market structure that is likely to emerge as stable, depending on the number and "power" of commodity suppliers in the market. For instance, when suppliers act as Stackelberg leaders and there are no commodities, N&S (2009) predict formation of a single all-inclusive supplier alliance. However, when an assembler uses commodity components and the collective relative margin of commodity suppliers becomes closer to that of the critical suppliers, it becomes more likely to see two sets of suppliers in the market, one of which contains only commodity suppliers. This information might be useful to assembler, as it implies that his position in the market might be stronger with respect to its suppliers compared with the case without commodities. We also note that our results hold when different mechanisms for selection of the winning commodity supplier are used. Moreover, they are valid for a large family of rules that one may choose to split the profit among suppliers belonging to a coalition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2 we describe decentralized assembly systems with k commodity components, and in §3 we describe coalition profit in that setting. §4 introduces stability concepts used in this work and identify stable outcomes for our model. We conclude in §5.
Decentralized Assembly System with Commodity Components
In this section, we describe the decentralized assembly system with n suppliers, each selling a component to a downstream assembler. The assembler purchases components from the upstream suppliers, assembles them, and meets demand for the final product. We assume that exactly k components are commodities; without loss of generality, we let this be components K = {n − k + 1, n − k + 2, . . . , n}. We assume that the assembler faces a simple linear demand, given by D(p) = a − bp, where p is the price of the final assembled product set by the assembler. Let us also assume without loss of generality that there is no downstream cost of assembling the components.
We first describe below the model that follows the logic from Jiang and Wang (2010) 1 . First, consider the non-commodity products, i = 1, . . . , n − k. The supplier for each of these components, i, incurs a production cost, c i , and sells the component to the assembler at cost w i . Next, for a commodity component j, j ∈ K, assume that there are multiple (say, µ j > 1) available suppliers.
We let the suppliers of commodity component (hereafter referred as commodity suppliers) face costs c jk , k = 1, . . . , µ j , with c jl ≤ c jk for l < k. Thus, in a model of competition between the suppliers for component j that purely favors price, c j = c j1 . After the competition among the commodity suppliers is resolved, the assembly system has exactly n suppliers (n − k critical and k winning commodity suppliers), each selling a complementary component to the downstream supplier.
In this paper, we allow the possibility that the winning supplier is not necessarily the cheapest one. That is, we do not preclude situations in which a more expensive supplier can bid for positions in a coalition of suppliers for smaller profits than the cheapest supplier, c j = c j1 . To allow for this generality, we merely specify what the range of margins and shares of profits would be for the commodity supplier who joins a coalition, rather than identify who it would be exactly. This will be made clear below.
To allow for non-negative demand, we impose a standard regularity condition, namely that
, while the profit of a supplier, i, can then be written as
We consider two possible models of competition between the assembler and the n suppliers.
First, we consider the Supplier Stackelberg game (SS), where the suppliers are Stackelberg leaders.
In this model, each supplier simultaneously determines a wholesale price w i , and the assembler then sets the retail price of the product. The market is controlled by suppliers, who play the role of Stackelberg leaders and take the assemblers' reaction function into consideration when making their wholesale price decisions. Next, we consider the Vertical Nash (VN) game, where suppliers and the assembler move simultaneously. In this setting, no player benefits from the first mover advantage.
In the VN game, a supplier may not be able to determine competing suppliers' wholesale prices (due to, for instance, a smaller size and a large number of players in the market), but can observe the final retail price, on which he conditions his decision. The assembler cannot observe suppliers' reaction functions, so she conditions her decision on the suppliers' wholesale prices. These two models of competition have been used in the literature to model market power (see, for instance, Choi, 1991) . We note that the choice of modeling power using the contracts and sequence of moves is simply to isolate the power dynamics in this system and its effect on coalitional outcomes. It is not our interest to explore contracts and their effects on the profit of the supply chain or to resolve underlying incentive issues. Moreover, we simply borrow this framework from existing work in operations management.
Under the SS model, for a component supplier that sells a commodity, we assume that
. That is, the margin of each commodity supplier is in equilibrium lower than that of any supplier in the model with no commodity components, while all critical suppliers enjoy an equal margin. Beyond this, we make no assumptions on how the competition between the commodity suppliers for a particular component is resolved. Therefore, we also do not make any assumptions on who enters the coalition. To simplify the expressions, we also denote
Following an analysis similar to that in N&S (2009), we obtain that the equilibrium prices are
Similar analysis for the VN model shows that
Coalition Analysis
The eventual objective of this paper is the analysis of stable coalitions formed by the suppliers in the above assembly systems. As a first step, in this section we establish some preliminary notations and describe the dynamics that are required for a stability analysis.
We allow suppliers to freely form coalitions among themselves. Once again, this simply follows the models in the literature that study supplier coalitions in assembly systems. A coalition of suppliers sell a kit of products (one from each member) and sets a wholesale price for that kit.
Thus, if there are l supplier coalitions, the assembler faces a vector (w 1 , ...w l ) and consequently sets the retail price p * (w 1 , ...w l ) of the product.
Let us first introduce some notation. We denote by N = {1, 2, . . . , n} the set of all suppliers. A subset S ⊆ N is called a coalition, and the set N of all suppliers is referred to as the grand coalition.
corresponds to a coalition structure; we use Z to denote the set of all possible coalition structures. Let Π Z i denote the profit obtained by player i in coalition structure Z. Thus, Π N i denotes the profit of a player, i, when the grand coalition is formed.
Before analyzing equilibrium prices and profits of coalitions, we need to resolve the issue of surplus allocation among coalition members. It is easy to see that at equilibrium the assembler purchases equal quantity, say Q, from each supplier coalition and sets p so that the demand equals Q units. If every coalition contains at least one critical supplier, each coalition is critical. Following an analysis similar to that in N&S (2009), this implies that the net profit obtained by each coalition is the same and is independent of its membership. We assume that coalition members divide the profit equally when the coalition does not contain any commodity supplier. This assumption is natural-in any coalitional setting in which players are equally valuable, any contribution-based rule would do exactly this. However, when the kit contains a commodity component, it is not obvious how one should divide the profits among members. There are numerous rules that one could use, and the choice between them is, to some extent, a matter of modeling preference. The choice, however, has significant ramifications on eventual predictions. For one, clearly, any future discussion of stability will be contingent on the allocation rule that is used. This is an important discussion and one that is central to the contribution of this paper. We defer this to a later section (section 4.2), in which we discuss our main results. For now, for illustrative purposes, we assume that the profit is allocated according to some pre-specified increasing function of each suppliers' margin generated in the case in which no coalition is formed, and that this function satisfies some basic regularity properties. As an example, consider a simple proportional rule-if a coalition contains l suppliers, and if we denote byK the set of s commodity suppliers contained among those l suppliers, each critical supplier's share corresponds to fraction
of the coalition profit, while a commodity supplier j receives fraction
This form of division of profit has many attractive properties. First, it resonates with commonly used allocation rules that are based on the marginal contribution of a member (however, it is more general). Second, as we will see in Section 4.2, this allocation rule is a member of a larger class of allocation rules, all of whom yield exactly the same stability results.
We also introduce a measure that takes into account the relative differences in the margins that different suppliers get. As one may imagine, when there are many commodity suppliers, their relative margins (which are lower than the critical ones) is perhaps more important than simply how many of the suppliers sell commodity components. The following three metrics are useful for us in this regard. We assume that min i∈K {∆c i } > 0 (that is, each supplier generates positive margin), and define
where m i is the margin of any critical supplier. These metrics, as is obvious, are simple measures of relative margins (and number) of commodity versus critical suppliers. They turn out to be useful in our analysis. For instance, a large ∆T implies systems in which the collective relative margins of critical suppliers significantly outweigh the commodity ones.
Next, we note some properties of the current assembly models for the different modes of competition. These basic properties are first steps in establishing stability results; demonstrating these are similar to N&S (2009). Whenever there are substantial differences, we note these in our later
proofs of stability and demonstrate them when necessary.
For the Stackelberg mode of competition (SS), the following properties hold:
Property I: Given a coalition structure Z ∈ P (N ), let Π Z (Z) be the profit obtained by coalition Z in coalition structure Z.
• If Z has at least one critical supplier, then Π Z (Z) is decreasing in |Z|.
• If Z has no critical suppliers, let ∆c * = max i∈Z {∆c i }. Then, Π Z (Z) is increasing in ∆c * , decreasing in |Z|, and is submodular in (∆c * , |Z|).
Property II:
The following results hold for defections and mergers:
• A single defection by a lone critical supplier is always myopically beneficial.
• Consider a coalition Z with both critical and commodity suppliers. If a defection is myopically beneficial to a commodity supplier with margin ∆c, then the same is true for all commodity suppliers in Z with margin of at least ∆c.
• For large n, mergers are superadditive.
Stable Outcomes
In this section we analyze the stability of supplier alliances. Before we describe the exact methodology, we will briefly try to motivate our framework.
Stability concepts
Game-theoretical concepts of stability are usually static. For example, consider the SS model that we analyzed in the previous section, and assume that the status quo position is the grand coalition of all suppliers. We know from Property II that it is beneficial for a supplier to defect from the grand coalition. The existing static concepts will immediately conclude that the grand coalition is not stable. There are potentially two fundamental problems with this logic. First, does this mean that the outcome in which a supplier competes with a coalition of n − 1 suppliers is stable? If not, why should we conclude that the move from the grand coalition will ever happen? Secondly, the static analysis does not check if a further defection from the outcome with the coalition of n − 1 suppliers will occur. Indeed, we know that a second defection by a supplier may be anticipated.
In fact, it may possibly happen that an initial defection triggers a sequence of further defections which eventually leads to an outcome in which the defecting parties accrue a lower payoff than the status quo. If this were the case, farsighted players may not choose to defect in the first place and thus an outcome which we thought was possibly not stable, may actually prove to be stable. A static concept, by definition, does not handle such trade-offs.
A solution concept that allows players to consider multiple possible further deviations is the largest consistent set, introduced by Chwe (1994) . It is defined below, and is used as the primary stability criterion in our analysis of stable alliance structures. Let us denote by ≺ i the players' strong preference relations, described as follows: for two coalition structures, Z 1 and
i , where Π Z i is a retailer i's profit in the coalition structure Z. If Z 1 ≺ i Z 2 for all i ∈ S, we write Z 1 ≺ S Z 2 . Denote by S the following relation: Z 1 S Z 2 if the coalition structure Z 2 is obtained when S deviates from the coalition structure Z 1 and S ∈ Z 2 . We say that Z 1 is indirectly dominated by Chwe (1994) proves the existence, uniqueness, and non-emptiness of the largest consistent set. Since every coalition considers the possibility that, once it reacts, another coalition may react, and then yet another, and so on, the LCS incorporates farsighted coalition stability.
Allocation rules and the invariance result for assembly systems
When one looks at the extant supply chain literature that looks at coalitional games, there seems to be two broad classes of research questions. The first one looks at prescribing allocation rules that share the costs or profits of a supply chain among its players so that a specified outcome (such as the grand coalition) that maximizes the joint surplus is sustained. Papers that fall under this category often ask the question "what allocation rules (if any) may yield the sustenance of the grand coalition (i.e., belong to the core)?". This framework has been applied to answer numerous operational problems such as inventory pooling, replenishment cost sharing, transhipment policies, and so on, starting with Hartman and Dror (1996) to recent papers such as Chen and Zhang (2009 we mean: in a pure assembly system with all critical suppliers, under most reasonable modes of competition, every supplier makes the same margin in equilibrium. That is, since all suppliers are equally important (the margins therefore being equal), in any supplier coalition, it is only natural to divide profits equally among suppliers. This facilitates a discussion of stability that does not need to justify the choice of allocation rules. However, as the reader may have already noticed, this is not the case in our study. When one considers a coalition where some suppliers are critical and others supply commodity components, it is not entirely clear how one divides the profit this coalition generates. In an earlier section, we had a reasonable but ad-hoc prescription-a marginal allocation rule. One could have used a more calculated marginal rule, such as the Shapley value, or a careful but cumbersome rule such as the nucleolus. The trouble now is that, as one can imagine, each one of these profit-sharing rules may conceivably produce stable outcomes (i.e., the LCS) that are quite different. Thus, any result on the stable supply chain structure will have to be conditioned on the sharing rule that was prescribed. This seems to be a weakness of sorts, in that one does not quite know how these are come upon in practice and, more importantly, obfuscates the intent of the paper (prescriptive or descriptive).
Herein comes the subsequent discussion and the result that follows: we first begin by specifying rules that allocations need to satisfy. Therefore, we confine ourselves to the family of allocations that respect these rules. More precisely, we specify rules for a mapping φ : IR L(n) → IR n , where L(n) is the set of all coalitions that can be formed by players in N , that specifies payoffs of φ(Z) = (φ i (Z)) i∈N for Z ∈ P (N ) as follows:
Rule 1: Symmetry-for any Z ∈ P (N ), any permutation π : N → N , and any player i ∈ N ,
Rule 2: Monotonicity-if two players in a coalition have margins m 1 and m 2 and m 1 ≥ m 2 , then
Rule 3: Convexity-let ϑ and υ be in IR L(n) , defined using an appropriate min-max rule, let
Rule 1 simply says that allocations and outcomes are unaffected by indices, and only by the virtue of underlying aspects of the game (in our setting, the number and margins of competitors).
The second rule is the simple monotonicity rule-essentially, in any coalition players with higher margins in the pure assembly game receive a contribution no lower than ones with a lower margin.
Note that these specifications are within a coalition in a specified structure, not across coalitions.
That is, there is a large set of specifications that respect this rule. Rule 3 is a standard rule that specifies allocation choices to the same rule that any general utility principle would respect.
We next verify that under the VN and SS models of competition Properties I and II hold for large n, and that the Shapley value and any monotonically increasing proportional allocations discussed earlier satisfy Rules 1-3. More importantly, we show that for reasonably large values of n, the stable outcomes are independent of the allocation rules one uses as long as they are in the family described above for the assembly models in question. This result is powerful in that it allows us to predict the eventual stable supply chain structure unfettered by the specific profit-sharing mechanism within a coalition. We also note that this invariance is quite powerful for assembly systems. For instance, the only necessary specifications are the properties that these systems need to possess, (i.e., Properties I and II) and reasonable requirements of the allocation rules in question; no additional requirement is made on the mechanism on how n, the size of the model, grows.
Theorem 1 For any allocation φ that respects Rules 1-3, under SS or VN competition modes (i.e.,
obeying Properties I and II) there exists n * ∈ IN such that the LCS is invariant under φ for n > n * .
We use this result in exact predictions of how the stable outcomes actually evolve for specific parameters of the models. This is described in the following section, where we give complete characterizations of the stable outcomes.
Stability results
We are now ready to describe the stable outcomes under the various modes of competition.
Throughout this section, as should be clear from the previous discussion, we assume that profits within a coalition are divided using an allocation rule in the family described in §4.2. In particular, the marginal allocation that we started with is one such an allocation.
Our first result looks at a setting in which ∆T is somewhat large. That is, the relative importance of the critical components over the commodity components is above a computable threshold.
Moreover, in this setting, we also allow the number of suppliers to be large. Although the result is of a threshold type, as can be seen from the proof, we can compute the value of n * efficiently.
In every instance (for all of the following results that we computed empirically), the threshold was quite reasonable (never higher than 14) 2 . The result states that in both the Stackelberg game and the VN game, the stable outcomes look exactly like those in pure assembly systems (please see N&S, 2009). In particular, in a farsighted sense, the grand coalition is stable in the Stackelberg games, while two equal-sized coalitions are stable in the VN game.
We first define a set of coalition structures consisting of two "equal-sized" coalitions:
where ∼ = denotes "as close to equal as possible". We now formalize our first result.
Theorem 2 Let k > 1. There exist t * and n * ∈ IN such that when ∆T > t * and n > n * , then 1. In the SS model, the grand coalition is uniquely stable;
2. In the VN model, coalition structures Z a , described in (1), are stable.
Next, we focus on the SS model. The stable outcomes depend on two forces: first, the relative importance of critical versus commodity components (as measured by ∆T ), and second, the spread of the margins between the commodity suppliers (as measured by ∆Y − ∆X). ∆Y − ∆X simply measures the difference between the maximum and minimum margins among the commodity suppliers. The results indicate that, when this difference is somewhat large and the value of ∆T is high, there are two possible stable outcomes-either the critical and commodity suppliers split cleanly and form coalitions among themselves, or the grand coalition of all suppliers form. This depends on the relative values of ∆T and ∆Y − ∆X. Now, when the difference in margins ∆Y − ∆X is smaller and the value of ∆T is still high, some commodity suppliers (the ones with the higher margins) join forces with the critical suppliers to form one coalition, and the remaining commodity suppliers form an alliance among themselves. There is a monotonicity in the split in the following sense: if a certain commodity supplier is in the alliance with the critical suppliers, then all commodity suppliers with a higher margin are also in this alliance. We also note that the grand coalition is always a candidate for stability. Interestingly, if one subjects the above candidates to further refinements such as external stability, the grand coalition starts getting ruled out as a possible stable outcome when ∆T becomes smaller.
2 The value of n depends on many factors, one being the value of (a − bC) 2 /C. Unless this value was smaller than .03, we were unable to get instances in which n was greater than 14.
The SS model endows the suppliers with a first-mover advantage; this advantage is maximized, in some sense, when they all unite forces. However, when this happens, some or all of the commodity suppliers receive low shares of this surplus due to their inherently weak negotiation position within the coalition. In fact, as the result shows, they are better of forming an alliance by themselves.
The discussion in N&S (2009) shows practical evidence to this effect in the tourism sector, as well as in the semi-conductor industry. The result is as follows:
Theorem 3 Let k > 1. In the SS model for large n we have the following results:
1. There are t * * , ∆C * , and d such that for ∆T > t * * the following holds: 
2. For −∞ < ∆T < t * * , the grand coalition is stable.
Our next result looks at the VN model. The VN model, as we had discussed earlier, moderates the power structure between the assembler and the suppliers in the sense that no one is endowed with a first-mover advantage. In a pure assembly system, as in N&S (2009), the resulting stable allocation was a split between suppliers into two equal-sized coalitions. Here, due to the presence of commodity suppliers, the results look different. The resulting stable coalition depends on the values of ∆T . When ∆T is high, three possibilities arise as being stable. One of them is the almost equal coalition split that we saw in Theorem 2. The other candidate, when the spread of the margins is somewhat high, is a three-member coalition structure in which commodity suppliers with very small margins form one alliance, and two other coalitions contain critical and commodity suppliers, respectively, as the stable outcome. Else, when the spread is lower, we see structures with two coalitions emerging as stable, with one of them having only commodity suppliers. In this case, it is interesting to see a small set of commodity suppliers (the weakest ones) forming their own alliance.
Finally, when ∆T is smaller, we once again see a two coalitional outcomes as being stable, in which one coalition contains critical suppliers and commodity suppliers with larger margins. The proof of this result follows directly from G&S (2009) and from the proof of Theorem 3.
Theorem 4 Let k > 1. In the VN model for large n there is t * * * < t * such that 1. if t * * * < ∆T < t * , then there are ∆C 1 and ∆C 2 such that the following outcomes are stable:
(a)
Conclusion
In this paper we have looked at general assembly systems in which there exist multiple suppliers for some components. Our interest is to look at farsighted stable alliance structures between suppliers in this system and isolate the differences that arise due to the presence of this competition. This is the first such study, and we provide a more-or-less comprehensive characterization. In doing so, we have proved some novel invariance results for assembly systems that address a fundamental issue in games with asymmetric players when one wants to compute and characterize dynamic stable outcomes. We believe that this paper has significantly furthered our understanding of stable alliance structures in assembly systems, as well as the theoretical literature on farsighted stability analysis for coalitions. We exploit some proof techniques that we hope will be useful to future researchers in this area.
Proof of Theorem 2:
1. Choose t * large enough (say, t * > n 2 (a−bC) 2 (n−k) ) so that for any N S X , we consider the sequence
N N, where at each step we choose a single member defecting from the largest coalition until it is no longer beneficial, or we keep defecting until Z n 1 is reached. In either case, n * can be chosen large enough so that N X i throughout the sequence.
2. We first need the following lemma.
Lemma 2 For any outcome X , to show that X S V is deterred when n > n * and ∆T > t * , we only need to use the set
in the definition of the LCS as the deterring set.
Proof of Lemma 2:
We first show that if Ω exhibits external stability with respect to and U ∈ LCS, then either U ∈ Ω or ∃B ∈ Ω such that B U and U B.
For any U ⊆ Z define on Ω U a relation ∼ U ⊆ Z × Z as follows:
We further define relation Ω ⊆ Z × Ω as (U, V) ∈ Ω if V ∈ Ω =⇒ U V and W ∈ Ω and V W =⇒ U W.
Let now n > n * produced by ALGO(INV) (see proof of Theorem 1). When ∆T is large enough, we can also see that the relation ♦ U =∼ U Ω is nonempty transitive.
nonempty for the VN game and the above description of Ω. Let Υ : 2 Z → 2 Z such that
Notice that if Υ has a unique fixed point, we have shown that lemma
, the lowest profit a k-member set in Ω can obtain. Υ k > Π A when ∆T is large and n > n * . Following the argument of the invariance result, Υ i+1 (A) ⊆ Υ i (A) when n > n * . Because Z is finite, there is W = ∅ such that Υ(W) = W and W is unique.
We next explore the structure of Ω LCS. We first show that if a m-equal coalition is deterred, so is an m + 1-equal coalition. Let Z m be an m-equal coalition that is not in the LCS. Then, for all defections Z m S B, there is a chain Z m S B S 1 B 1 · · · B k S k+1 W, such that Υ(W) = W, W >> B and W S Z m . Consider now an an m + 1-equal coalition Z m+1 . For any P and U such that Z m+1 P U, construct Z m+1 P U N N P 1 Z m and imitate above chain used to deter Z m . It is easy to see that Z m+1 is deterred by appropriate choice of W. This also shows that N is not in the LCS.
We next show that Z 2 , a two-equal coalition, externally dominates all outcomes. For arbitrary a, b, S such that a S b, consider a S b S 1 b 1 S 2 b 2 . . . Z n 1 N N Z 2 . We have shown that Υ(Z 2 ) = Z 2 and Υ 2 (Z n 1 ) ∈ B, so either Z 2 a in the above chain or in a pruned chained before Z n 1 is reached (for, if no such chain exists, then Υ(X ∈ Ω ) is not well defined). This implies Z 2 is in the LCS and is unique.
Proof of Theorem 3:
1. Consider the following sequence:
where at each step one critical supplier defects. Chose n, d such that N Z b in the above chain and π N critical − π 2. Let −∞ < ∆T < t * * . First, consider the case ∆Y − ∆X > 0. Then, there exists a large n * such that for n > n * we have π N critical − π . For such n > n * and any outcome Z, build a chain that gets Z . . . Z b (in finite number of steps using defections from the largest coalition), and then Z b . . . N using (A1). Notice that for Z = N we get that N is deterred; this is because Υ 2 (V N ) Υ({Z b }) = ∅. Now, choose t 3 > t * * such that Υ 2 (N ) Υ(X) = ∅ for all X that have external stability; this is possible by proof in part 1. This shows that for ∆T < t 3 , N is uniquelly stable. Now, assume ∆Y − ∆X ≤ 0; the proof is similar except for the choice of t 3 , so we omit the details.
